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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTArl
UTArl RESTAURANI ASSOCIATION,
Utah non-profit corporation,
and ANihONY'S INC., a Utah
corµoration, dba Anthony's
Restaurant,
3

Case No.

19213

Plaintiffs and Respondents

-vsDAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF

RE.SPO~DENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final

judgment of the

District Court of Davis County.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOwER COURT
The District Court of Davis County ruled that the "Food
SLlrvices Establishment Permit Fee Schedule" imposed by tlie
Appellant W3S invalid,

restrained the Appellant from attempting

to impose 3ny charges pursuant to that Schedule, and Ordered
the Appellant to return any payments theretofore received from
~~;persons

pursuant to that Schedule

CR.

250).

l'<ATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant does not challenge the determination of the
Court that the Schedule and the fees imposed thereunder are
invalid,

but seeks a declaration from this Court that the

Appellant has the authority to impose an inspection fee if such
inspection fee is subsequently adopted pursuant to the
procedures set forth in Section 26-24-20, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As reflected above, the Appellant failed to make any
Findings of Fact as required by Section 26-24-20, Utah Code
Annotated <1953>, as amended.

The record failea to establish

any basis for the establishment of the Fees set forth in the
Fee Schedule, even as "informal" findings.

However, at the

September 7, 1982 meeting, it was reflecteu that Mr. Harvey
stated that the cost of administering the entire food service
program (not just inspections) of the Appellant was
approximately $53,000 and that the Fee Schedule proposed would
generate approximately $16,000.

It was further reflected that

the health department collects about $6,000 per year from food
handlers' tests, that one-fourth of the budget was covered by
mill levy, and that there were various other programs that
bring in revenue to supplement the costs of the program

CR. 133).
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, after
determining that the Appellant had failed to comply with the
statutory requirements in attempting to impose the aforesaid
Fee Schedule, the lower Court further found that the Appellant

-2-

was acting in excess of its statutory authority in attempting
to impose the type of fees involved in this matter.
Additionally, the Court found that the Fee Schedule, in
reality, amounted to the attempted imposition of a tax, rather
than a "fee", thereby renoering the attempted imposition of the
charges under that Schedule invalid.

Finally, the lower Court

determir.J that the Davis County Board of health did not have
the authority to assess a "fee schedule" such as the one in
this case

(rt.

243-247).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

MJT

TtlE

JUDGME~T

Of THE DISrRICT COURT IS

COl'IT£ST"-D BY THi, APP£LLANT Al'D, 1tlERErORE,
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

The Appellant has taken a rather unique approach on
this matter in that it is now seeking only an advisory opinion
from this Court.

As earlier reflected,

the Judgment of the

lower Court merely found that the "Fee Schedule" of the
Aprellant was invalid and that no charges could validly be
imposed thereunder.

That Judgment is properly supported by

unchallenged Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
~µp~llant

is now attempting to appeal,

Judgment but, rather,

The

not from that final

from certain of the lower Court's

t1ndings ana conclusions which Appellant feels were erroneous,
but which would not affect the Judgment.
-3-

Notwithstanding the

fact that the issues reflected in the Appellant's Brief are
ones which the Respondent would also wish to see put to rest,
it is respectfully submitted that such advisory opinions are
not the function of this Court and, since the Judgment of the
lower Court is not challenged, this appeal should properly be
dismissed or the Judgment of the lower Court summarily
affirmed.
As hereinafter reflected,

the Respondents contend that

the Court not only entered a correct Judgment but also entered
findings and conclusions relative to this matter, all

of which

were correct.
POINT II
THE DISfHICT COUR1 COKRECTLY DETERMlNSC THAT
APPELLANT HAS NO SfATUTORi AUTH0R1Ii
TO ESTABLISH AN l~~PECTION F~~ RE~ULAfIN~
FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMEN1S.
The Appellant relies,

TH~

for its power to assess the fees

involved in this matter, on Section 26-24-14, Utah Code
Annotated (1953), as amended, which merely provides:
"A local health department, shall have in
addition to all other powers and duties imposed on it,
the following powers and duties:

* * *

(14) Establish and collect arpropriate fees,
accept, use and administer all federal, state , or
private donations or grants of funds.
(emphasis addredl.

-4-

to

The Appellant maintains that,

under this section,

combined with Sections 26-24-3 and 26-24-8, Utah Code Annotatea
~·

as amended,

it has been granted jurisdiction for

sanitation and health matters throughout the incorporated and
unincorporated areas of the County and has been authorized and
directed by the legislature to impose such "user fees" as it
may desire on businesses, such as the restaurants or food
service establishments.

!Appellant's Brief, p. SJ.

However,

while the legislature has specifically authorized some agencies
to assess "user fees",

it has, at the same time, placed guarded

restrictions upon the imposition of those fees.
sam

0

Even in the

act as that which established the local health

deparLoents,

the legislature allowed the State Department of

Health to impose such fees only after providing, at Section
26-1-6, Utah Code Annotated 11953), as amended, as follows:
"The department may adopt a schedule of fees
that may be assessed for services rendered by the
department, provided that such fees shall be reasonable
and fair and shall be submitted to and approved by the
legislature as part of the department's annual
appropriations request.
"
It is respectfully submitted that it would be patently
unr asonable to presume that the legislature would have
0

intended to give the local department of health carte blanche
f~r

the imposition of user fees at the same time they were

Leing so careful to limit the powers of the State Department of

-5-

Health to impose such fees.

Rather, it is much more reasonable

to assume that the provision regarding the imposition of fees
by the local department was merely intended to grant powers
similar to those granted to other governmental bodies to impose
the usual types of fees such as for the cost of preparing
certificates, copying fees, and other unusual services which
may be sr.cifically requested by a given party and which do not
benefit the public in general.
There is no question but that, under the Local nealth
Department Act, the legislature gave certain responsibilities
to the local departments of health to make investigations and
inspections for the health and welfare of the general populace
of the county,

including the power to formulate rules and

regulations for the promotion of public health, which are
necessary and consistent with the legislation and its intent,
and which, once properly adopted, would then have the effect of
law.

This does not change, however, the fact that there is no

specific statutory authority for the type of "fees" the
Appellant sought to impose in this matter for the purpose of
transfering those costs of protecting the public health to a
limited class of taxpayers.
The lower Court, contrary to the contentions of the
Appellant, did not state that the Appellant did not have the
authority to pass a law assessing a fee

-6-

(Appellant's Brief,

p.

9).

have

The Court merely determined that the Appellant did not

the authority to assess a "Fee Schedule" such as that in

this case for food service inspections.
d~ny

(R. 247 J.

It did not

its right to impose fees for minor items such as preparing

certificates, copying fees, and other similar fees for specific
services rendered to particular persons for their specific
benefit, such as

have

been traditionally imposed by

governmental bodies, as reflected in Section 26-24-14, Utah
Code Annotated

<1953), as amended.

(R. 245-246).

Appellant argues that the power to assess such fees may
be

pr~perly

delegated to the Appellant since boards now play

such an important part in the administration of our
laws.(Aprellant's Brief, p. 9).

However, the lower Court found

that the legislature did not delegate the power to assess such
fees to the Appellant (R. 245-246), so the question of whether
the legislature could delegate such power was not involved in
that particular determination.
"ampl~

Thus, whether or not there is

protection for any aggrieved person if the Board of

health should impose an unreasonable or arbitrary or
inappropriate fee"
1J11estion.

<Appellant's Brief, p. llJ is not the

The legislature simply did not give the Boara the

power to impose such fees.

-7-

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DLTLRMINLD TriAT TrlE
APPELLANT DID NO'I' HAVc ANY IMPLIED AUTnURITY T\J EiiTABLISrl
AN INSPECTION FEE REGULATING FOOD SERVICE ES~ABLISHMENTS.
Appellant next contends, even if the statute did not
specifically grant the Appellant the power to impose a fee
its inspections,

for

that the power to impose such inspections

carries with it the power to i1npose a fee to cover the costs
thereof.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 12l.

Admittedly, some of the

cases have indicated the existence of such implied fee
assessment powers. However, those cases have dealt with electea
governmental bodies which may be given the power to tax by the
legislature.

The Appellant in this matter is merely an

administrative body, established pursuant to Sections 26-24-4
and 26-24-5, Utah Code Annotated 11953), as amended.

73-74).

IR.

It is not a municipal body whose members are elected by

the people or whose
the people.

me~bership

As such,

is established by election by

it has no power, and may be granted no

power, to impose taxes such as a municipality may be granted.
It has no implied taxing or police powers and is not a
corporate authority within the meaning of Article XIII, Sec.
of the Constitution of Utah.

See State ex.

Standiford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1G61

-8-

11901).

rel.

~right

v.

S

While the legislature may provide for the execution of
its legislative policy though administrative bodies and grant
those bodies certain powers to determine the existence of facts
upon which the execution of the legislative policy may depend,
it may not transfer the essential legislative functions such
as determining taxes.
v.

In Western Leather and Finding Company

State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526 (1935),

the

Court explained:
The legislature is not permitted to abdicate or
transfer to others the essential legislative function
with which it is thus vested.
48 P. 2d at 528.
Thus, while a city may argue that its fees imposed are
taxes, police powers, or merely charges to offset particular
expenses,

the Appellant's imposition of charges may not legally

fall within that taxing category.

Under these circumstances,

the distinction between a city or local governing board and a
non-governmental appointed body becomes very important.
Provo City v.
477

(1917),

In

Provo Meat Packing Company, 49 Utah 528, 165 P.

for instance,

the court found that the power to

impose a "license fee or a license tax" is within the police
powers of the state to regulate or prohibit a business and
tha~,

inherent in those powers, is the power to tax for the

,-,,st of such regulation.
tl1at

However, the Court also made it clear

such powers arise out of the taxing powers of the

,:,,vernmental body, which taxing powers do not exist as to the

-9-

Appellant in this matter.

Bennion Gas

&

Coal cited by t 11e

Appellant at page 12 of its brief is simply in line with the
foregoing cases.
Therefore, unless the imposition of the ass2ssments set
forth in the Appellant's "Fee Schedule" in this matter come
within the traditional concept of a fee,

rather than a

"license" fee or tax, it is invalid.
POINT IV

ThE DISI'J:UCI COURT Pil.OP!:.J:l.L:i D£'1ER<'ilN£D TtiAT l'tiE.
"FEE SCtiEDUL£" SOLJGti1' TO BE IMPO;:iED B:i Tt:it, APP£LLAt.T
COt~STl'lUTJ::D

A TAX RATt:iER

As earlier reflected,

I'tiA·' A FEc.

the Appellant does not challenge

the decermination of the Court that there were no Findings of
Fact or Conclusions of Law upon which the Court could
reasonably determine the basis used by the Appellant in
establishing the "Fee Schedule" involved herein, although
Section 26-24-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended,
clearly requires the same, wherein it specifies:
The hearings may be conducted by the board at a
regular or special meeting, or the board may appoint
hearing officers, who shall have power and authority
to conduct hearings in the name of the board at a
designated time and place.
A recora or summary of
the proceedings of any hearing shall be taken and
filed with the board, together with findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and the order of the board
or hearing officer.

-10-

Although that section further mandates, in subsection
1SJ, that copies of those Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
anu the Order be filed along with the Answer to the Petition on
appeal to the District Court, no such Findings or Conclusions
were filed with the Answer of the Appellant herein, and the
Stipulation confirms the non-existence of these crucial items
in this matter.

(R. 74-75J

These Findings and Conclusions are

for the purpose of establishing the bases of the Board in
enacting the regulation, along with reflecting the existence of
the constitutional and statutory bases for its enact;nent.

The

lower Court, in its "Ruling" explained the problem that such a
fai 1 ure created.

rhe Court explained:

The purpose for findings and conclusions
are so the basis for the board's order can be clearly
established.
While it is true that this court can
read the documents and records and make an assumption
as to what the board's basis for its order was, this
court does net believe that is sufficient.
The
plaintiff is entitled to have the board follow the
statutory procedures which includes making formal
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(R. 228)
The critical nature of these items is further
r~fJected

in this Court's opinion in Banberry Development Corp.

v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah, 1981 J.

That matter

1nv0lved one of several cases involving "impact fees,"
"ouilding permit fees," and other charges imposed by various
01ties to help offset the massive "growing pains" they were
suffering due to high population growth in low population

-11-

areas.

The issues as to the validity of these various fee

imposing regulations hinged on the same constructional and
Constitutional standards which must be considered
currently before this Court.

i~

the matter

In Banberry, the Court explained:

Since the information that must be used to assure
that subdivision fees are within the standard of
reasonableness is most accessible to the municipality, that body should disclose the basis of its
c~:culations to whoever challenges the reasonableness of its subdivision or hookup fees.
Once that
is done, the burden of showing failure to comply
with the constitutional standard of reasonableness
in this matter is on the challenger. 631 P. 2d at
904.
See also Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P. 2d 375 !Utah,
1982) and Home Builders Association of Greater Salt Lake v.
Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P. 2d 451

11972).

Although no such findings or conclusions were prepared,
the Appellant contends that, "The record is without dispute
that the cost of the food service inspection

progr~n

is

approximately $53,000 and that the inspection fee imposed by
the Appellant would offset only a portion of the cost of the
total program."

IAppella11t's Brief, p. 7).

It is respectfully

submitted that this statement is not accurate.
referred to by the Appellant, establishes, at

The record, as
~ost,

that the

cost of the entire food service program is approximately
$53,000 (R. 133). Nowhere in the record is there any reflection
regarding the cost of the food service inspection program.
Also, as reflected therein, the particular schedule involveu
-12-

h0rein would have produced $16,000, which may have been more or
i~ss

than the cost of the food service inspection
Throug~out

progr~n.

the entire record, there is a distinct and

glaring absence of any findings or conclusions regarding any of
tl1e followi:-ig vital matters:
(1)

The costs of the inspections, as opposed to
the other fooa service programs;

(2)

The effects of cash registers, drive-up wi:-idows,
or other points where food is dispensed, upon the
costs of inspections;

(3)

Ihe effects of increased numbers of seats upon the
costs of ins2ections;

(4)

The proportionate benefit from the inspection
to the public in general, as opposed to
restaurants and other food service establishments;
or even
progra~

15)

The means, if any, of dedicating funds obtained
for the purpose of the inspection program;

Thus, although purportedly based on costs of
ins~e2tions,

no facts appear on the record which would justify

t'w imposition of the Fees specified under the "Fee Schedule"

e-_·,_·c, if the record before the Board had been properly
established with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. There
•"'>lstcd no basis, therefore, on which it could be concluded
- '1cit

the "Fee Schedule" was anything other than a "tax" and

,-,,uld not be imposed by the Board.

-13-

The general concept that an administrative boay simply
has no power to impose a "tax", and the factors to be
considered in distinguising between a "tax" and a "fee" was
well set forth by the United States' Supreme Court in

~ational

Cable Televisions Association v. Unitea States, 94 S. Ct. 1146,
415 U.S. 336, 39 L.

Ed. 2d 370

(1974).

There, Congress had

required in its Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952,
31

u. s.

C. Sec. 483a:
"It is the sense of the Congress that any work, service
benefit, .
.license, .
. or similar thing of
value or utility performed, furnished, provided, granted
. by an Federal agency .
. to or for any person
(including . . . corporations . . . ) . . . shall be
self-sutaining to the full extent possible, and the
head of each Federal agency is authorized by regulation
. to prescribe therefor
. such fee, charge, or
price therefor .
. such fee, charge, or price, if any,
as he shall determine .
. to be fair and equitable
taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to
the Government, value to the recipient, public policy or
interest served, and other pertinent facts .
Based thereon,

the FCC sought to impose a revised fee

schedule for CATV systems by estimating its direct and indirect
costs for CATV regulation and then, while retaining its earlier
imposed filing fees, added an annual fee for each CATV s;stem
at $0.30 per subscriber, on the basis that this would meet its
annual costs and approximate the "value to the recipient" as
used in the foregoing Act.

-14-

The Court, with two dissenting votes, explained the
distinction between taxation and fee levying powers, as
follows:
"Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which
is the sole organ for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily
and disregard benefits bestowed by the Government on a
taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, based on
property or income.
A fee, however, is incident to a
vr~Jntary act, e. g., a request that a public agency
p.~mit an applicant to practice law or medicine or
construct a house or run a broaacast station. The public
agency performing those services normally may exact a
fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on
the applicant, not shared by other members of society."

* * * * *
"There is no doubt that the main function of the
Commission is to safeguard the public interest in the
broadcasting activities of members of the industry.
If
assessments are made by the Commission which are
sufficient to recoup costs Lo the Commission for its
oversight, the CATV's and other broadcasters would be
paying not only for benefits they r~ceived but for the
protective services rendered the public by the
C o;nm i s s ion . "

* * * * •
"~hile those who operate CATV's may receive special
benefits, we cannot be sure that the Co~nission used the
correct standard in setting the fee. It is not enough to
figure the total cost (direct and indirect) to the
Commission for operating a CATV unit of SJpervision and
then to contrive a formula that reimburses the
Com1nission for that amount.
Certainly some of the costs
inured to the benefit of the public, unless the entire
regulatory scheme is a failure, which we refuse to
assume."
94 S. Ct. at 1147-1148.

The Court then reversed the lower Court's holding of
n,,~,

validity of the FCC "fees".

See also Federal Power

-15-

Commission v. New England Power, 415 U. S. 345, 391 L.

Ed.

2d

383, 94 S. Ct. 1151 (1974), and Stewart v. Verde River
Irrigation Company, 68 P. 2d 329
The

(Ariz., 1937 ).

New York Courts have also employed this distinction

regarding such matters.

In Nitkin v. Administrator of Health

Service, 91 Misc. 2d 478, 399 N.'i. Supp. 2d 162 11975), the Court
examined a fee schedule imposed by the Board of Health which,
in addition to the license fees otherwise imposed, imposed a
fee upon various radioactive materials installations to cover
the cost of its Bureau of Radiation Control.

The Court

explained:
"It is necessary to distinguish between taxes levied in
the form of fees and fees which are established to
defray the specific function of the licensing or
registration.
A tax levied in the form of a fee, in
order to be valid, must originate froir. a legislative
body, be it the State Legislature or a local legislative
body, pursuant to enabling legislation.
The purpose of
such a "fee" is concededly to raise revenue. The license
"fees" for the registration of the professions are valid
if enacted not under the police power, but rather under
the power of taxation (People ex rel. Moskowitz v.
Jenkins, 202 N.Y. 53, 94 N.E. 1065).
A true fee on the
other hand is a charge imposed to defray the cost of a
particular service rendered by government to the
individual (citing cases).

* * *

In dealing with a licensing or registration fee, imposed
by an administrative agency, as in the case at bar, such
a fee may not exceed the sum which will compensate the
licensing or registration authority, for issuing and
recording the license or registration and pay for the
inspection to see to the enforcing of the licensing or
registration provisions (Citing cases)

* * *
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Furthermore, such a fee cannot incluae a charge for the
general regulation of the industry (citing cases).

* * *

Based thereon,

that Court found the "fees" to be "taxes" and

hence invalid.
even where a governmental entity with the general power
tc iffipose a "tax" is involved, the Courts are often called upon
to

det~rmine

whether a particular "fee" imposed is a reasonable

one or whether an unreasonable "tax" is involved.

This Court

has been called upon numerous times to review such matters and
has established a substantial body of law which, Respondents
submit, establishes that the "Fee Schedule" sought to be
imposed in this matter is,
In

~eber

26 Ut_ah 2d 215,

indeed, a "tax", not a "fee."

Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy City,
487 P.

2d 866

rited "impact fee" cases,

'1971), the first of the often

the city had raised the cost of a

bJilJing permit fee for the conceded purpose of obtaining
~jJitional

money for the city's general fund.

The Court

exp;ained:
"If the money collected is for a license to engage in a
business and the proceeds therefrom are purposed mainly
to service, regulate and police such business or
activity, it is regarded as a license fee.
On the other
hand, if the factors just stated are minimal, and the
money collected is mainly for raising revenue for
general municipal pur?oses, it is properly regarded as
the imposition of a tax, and this is so regardless of
the terms used to describe it.
In some states, where
the power granted cities does not expressly authorize
the collection of a license fee for the purpose of
-17 -
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SSS S.V..

2d 832,
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835

(1977l:

'If the burden cast upon the subdivider is
reasonable attributable to his activity, then
the requirement (of dedication or fees in lieu
thereof) is permissible; if not, it is forbidden
and amounts to a confiscation of private
property in contravention of the constitutional
prohibitions rather than a reasonable regulation
under the police power.'
Reasonableness obviously holds the municipality to a
higher standard of rationality than the requirement that
its actions not be arbitrary or capricious.
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. City of West
Jordan, Supra., the benefits derived from the exaction
need not accrue solely to the subdivision (614 P. 2d at
1259); flood control and recreation are needs that
cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the
municipality.
At the same time, the benefits derived
from the exaction must be of "demonstrable benefit" to
the subdivision (Id. at 1259) 631 P. 2d. at 905.
(emphasis added).
In Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 271
1979) on reh.,

614 P. 2d 1257

matter for further hearings

(Utah,

(Utah, 1980>, in remanding the

(the initial case arose on a motion

for summarj judgment), the court explairied the needs for such
further proceedings, explaining:
"In this case the rule adopted by this Court in Call I,
quoted ante, cannot be applied without plaintiffs being
given the opportunity to present evidence to show that
the dedication required of them had no reasonable
relationship to the needs for flood control or parks and
recreation facilities created by their subdivision, if
any.
Implicit in this rule is the requirement that if
the subdivision generates such needs and West Jordan
exacts the fee in lieu of dedication, it is only fair
that the fee so collected be used in such a way as to
benefit demonstrably the subdivision in question.
This
is not to say that the benefit must be solely to the
particular subdivision, but only that there be some
demonstrable benefit to it.
614 P. 2d at 1259 (emphasis
added l.
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Similarly to Continental Bank v. Farmington, Infra., the

SPrvices provided in the case at bar are not services requested
by the Restaurants but rather,

and local

and are,

are actions mandated by state

law to protect the interests of the public at large
to say the least, of questionable benefit to

rt-'Staurants.

If the inspection were refused, the restaurant

could not operate, notwithstanding its license. Although claims
were made by the Appellant that the inspections involve an
educational process for the restaurants

CR. 29),

the

restaurants have no alternative but to undergo those
insp<0ctions or lose their permit to operate.

This "service"

does not benefit the restaurant, and, in fact, may directly
damage a restaurant which fails to meet the requirements
imposed by those inspections, whereupon its permit to operate
could be terminated.

Further, the public has no way of knowing

when or if a restaurant was inspected and all restaurants are
not even inspected the same number of times each year.
102).

CR.

If any benefit is bestowed upon a restaurant by the

"services" of the board of health, those benefits are only
incidental to the public benefit obtained therefrom.
iBt

See

ional Cable, Supra.
In addition to its failure to bear a reasonable

1~Jationship

to the costs of the "service" to be rendered, and

its failure to provide a "demonstrable benefit" to those upon
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whom the "fees" are imposed in the case at bar, the Appellant's
"Food Service Establishment Fee Schedule" further attempts to
divide the business of the restaurants into various component
parts to provide additional fund raising bases.

This,

it is

respectfully submitted, is contrary to the general rule, as
expressed by McQuillan in his treatise on Municipal
Corporations, cited in Provo City, Supra, at v.

3, Sec. 1003,

wherein the author explains:
"A municipal corporation cannot, by ordinance, under the
delegated general power to tax privileges, segregate the
several elements of right that accrue to the citizen
under one taxable privilege, as recognized, defined and
declared by law, and tax each of such elements as a
separate and distinct privilege of its own creation, as,
for exa.nple, by dividi.1g several privileges into many
and requiring separate licenses to sell special articles
which nece~sarily belong to on2 legal privilege, and
which the law permits to be sold under one license.
To
express the rule in other words, power to impose a
license tax upon a business does not authorize a
division of the business into its constituent elements,
parts, or incidents, and levy a separate tax on each or
any element, part, or incident thereof."
The restaurants, after all, are already subject to
having a license to operate as a restaurant,

fees for which are

supposedly to cover the costs of regulating their operations or
the restaurant.

By charging one license "fee" to operate,

where it necessarily involves the preparation and service of
food, and then requiring another "permit fee" to sell the food
and another "food handler fee" for persons to be authorized to
handle the food,

the cities and municipal governments, along
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with their administrative agencies such as the Appellant
!1e>rein, are attempting to break down the one privilege to
operate a restaurant into a myriad of separate permits and
fees, all for the purpose of securing additional revenue for
their general operations.

The fact that this duplicating of

fees results, as Appellant notes in its Brief, at least in the
unincorporated areas of the County where the food service
establishments would be subject to licensing by Davis County
IAprellant's Brief, p. BJ is sufficient to render the action
im~roper

under those decisions.

However, the Appellant in this

matter is the local board of health for the cities as well and,
therefore, its "fees" would also be duplicitous in the
incorporated areas of the county.

Since the Court made no

:inJing in this regard, however, the question of the lower
:ourt's misinterpretation of this matter would not appear
significant to this Appeal.
It is very significant, however, that the "Fees"
im~os~d
f0~

in the Appellant's "Food Service Establishment Permit

Schedule" are not even dedicated to cover the expenses of

ti1e> fooJ service progra.n of the Appellant.
ci

In fact, this i:actor

I Jn·-· should be adequate to determine that the assessments

''••cr·_·under are, in fact,
~rP

"taxes" and not "fees." Although these

supposedly assessed to cover the costs of the food service

rragrdm,

the Appellant indicated at the hearing before the
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lower Court that the "fees" are to be deposited to the county's
general fund

<Tr. 19-20, R.

135), and thereby become subject to

the directions of the County as to whether the funds for the
intended inspections will even be approved in the Budget of the
Department. Under such circumstances, the Courts have indicated
that, regardless of whether the fees are ultimately used for
the

purpo~2s

initially indicated, the validity of the

imposition must be determined as of the time it is imposed.
In Lafferty v.

Payson City, Supra.,

the court discussed

Call, Banberry, and Home Builders, Supra., and noted that the
distinction as to whether the fees were valid or invalid hinged
on the basis that "a reasonable charge for a specific service
is permissible, whereas a general fee that amounts to a revenue
measure is not."

The court further noted:

"We reaffirm that

distinction, and agree with the district court's conclusion
that the impact fee deposited in the cities general revenues in
this case is an illegal tax."

<Citing Weber Basin, Supra. I

Finally, the court explained:
"It appears from the City's answers to interrogatories
and requests for admissions that the City has collected
$98,000 by its impact fee, which sum the City has
allocated for capital improvements in the following
areas: electrical, 20%; sewage treatment plan expansion,
60%; and water, 20%.
But these allocations <some now
expended and some not) do not alter our conclusion.
Th~
validity of a fee imposed to augment general revenues is
determined by its legal status at the time it is
exacted, without regard to how the funds are later
allocated or spent.
This is not a case like those
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involving connection fees, where the ordinances imposing
the fees designated the collections for specific uses."
Again,

in Continental Bank and Trust Company v.

Farmi no ton City, 599 P. 2d 1242 (Utah, 1979 J, the Court
reviewed a license fee imposed on Lagoon by the City of
Far~1n3ton,
r~v~nues

ostensibly with an intent to applf the increased

to upgrade the services to Lagoon.

However, the court

"Tne trial court specifically found that the amount of
revenue anticipated from license fee bore no relation to
the costs of services provided Lagoon.
Farmington spoke
extensively for the need of upgraded services to Lagoon,
indicating an intent on the part of the city to apply
revenues to that end.
Beyond very general reference in
the preamble of the ordinance, however, no dedication of
revenue funds to that purpose is made.
Moreover,
evidence appears in the trial transcript tendin3 to
indicate that the tax was imposed with an eye to
municipal purposes of a much broader sweep." 599 P. 2d
at 1246, (emphasis added).
Based upon these factors,

the court found that the

ordinance was invalid, explaining:
"fhe effective result of the ordinance, as presently
constituted, is the imposition upon a single enterprise
of a tax, the revenues of which could at the discretion
of t~e city, be devoted to any municipal corporate
purt_:iosP."

* * * * *
"The conclusion i3 inescapable that a situation such as
the one at hand, where a municipality imposes a
potentia~ly crippling tax on a single business for the
benefit of the community as a whole, coupled with vague
promises of improved services which the business has not
been guaranteed, and to a large extent, does not need,
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presents such a case of abuse of taxing power." 599 P.
2d at 1246.
It is respectfully submitted that,

in the case at bar,

that, as the lower Court determined, there is no reasonable
relationship reflected in the record between the "fees" imposed
and the costs of the services rendered nor of any demonstrable
benefit to the restaurants in return for such "fee".
the contrary directly appears.

In fact,

Further, since there is no

dedication of the funds for use in even operating the food
service program of the Appellant, there is only one sure result
from the imposition of the fee.
revenues of the county.

.the increase cf the general

As such, the "fee" is, in fact, a tax

which may not be imposed by the Appellant herein and,
therefore, the lower Court properly determined that the "Fee
Schedule" was invalid, and would have been invalid even if the
proper Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law had been entered
by the Board reflecting the factors which the Appellant now
claims constituted the bases for the adoption of the "Fee
Schedule."
CONCLUSION
The Respondents respectfully submit that, based upon
the foregoing that this Court should dismiss this Appeal or
summarily affirm the Judgment of the lower Court on the grounds
that the Appellant has not appealed from the Judgment of the
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lower Court herein and,

to·c correct.

Rather,

in fact,

has conceded that Judgment to

the Appellant seeks only to have certain

:1ndings reviewed which would not affect the Judgment.
111 the event the Court deter.mines to

questions posed as to those certain findings,

review the
the Respondents

respectfully submit that the findings and conclusions of that
:ourt we:.

correct in each instance and that,

in fact,

the

BoarJ did not have the statutory, nor the implied, authority to
impose the fees sought to be

imposed in the Appellant's "Fee

SchedJle," even if it had followed all statutory procedures.
Further,

it is submitted that the "fee" which the Appellants

sought to impose was, actually, an invalid "tax", based upo!l
t~e

fact that the record discloseb:

(1)

no reasonable

between the costs of the inspections to particular

r~lationship

food service operations and the Permit Fee Schedule sought to
b~

imposed;

r~as~n

( 2)

no demonstrable benefit to the restaurants by

of the inspections; and

(31

no dedication of the funds

received to cover the expenses of the inspections.

Since the

Appellant is not a body with the power to impose a tax, even if
a0thorized by the legislature,

the lower Court properly

ajJ-idged the Appellant's "Fee Schedule" to be i!lvalib and
r~<trd1ned
i:ici

it from any further imposition of fees thereunder

Ordered a

~uJrt

should,

return of any fees collected thereunder.

This

therefore, affirm the Judgment of the Lower Court
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and determine its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be
proper in all respects.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of August, 1983.

ATKIN

By:

&

ANDERSON

Gary E. Atkin
Attorneys for Respondents
185 South State Street, # 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)
521-2552
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